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LAW AND ECOLOGICAL CONFLICTS:
THE CASE OF THE SACRED COW IN INDIA
Aurélien Bouayad*
The status of the cow in India has not only been the object of academic debates,
but also of fierce and impassionate legislative and judicial battles. These disputes
have notably crystalized over the admissibility of ritual sacrifice of cows by
Muslim practitioners for the holiday of Bakr-Id, with the issue reaching the
courts on several occasions. This paper explores the terms of this legal debate,
and the solutions that have been progressively adopted by the legislative and
judicial institutions after the independence. Particular attention will be paid to
the processes involved in the apprehension of the religious justification of this
practice by the judiciary. Eventually, the Indian legal system has failed at
acknowledging the importance and the complexity of the Muslim minority’s
ecological beliefs and traditions in this long-standing dispute.

I. INTRODUCTION
If the veneration of the cow in Hindu culture constitutes almost a cliché of
the diversity of human-animal relations throughout the world, there is another
religious tradition concerning this animal that has attracted relatively less
attention outside the borders of India: their ritual sacrifice by Muslims for BakrId. These two traditions have logically been the source of important tensions
between the two main religious communities of the country. Yet, deciding this
conflict has proved a delicate task for the legislative and judicial institutions of
India after independence. Should the practice be accommodated in the name of
the protection of religious freedom and cultural identity? Or should the peculiar
protection afforded to the animal by the Hindu majority prevail?
For the purpose of this discussion, I propose to consider these traditions
as ecological. The term should not be understood in its political sense, where it
refers to a political ideology that aims at creating an ecologically sustainable
society; nor should it be understood in its scientific sense, where it refers to the
* The author is a Ph.D. Candidate at Sciences Po Paris Law School, France.
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study of the interactions among organisms and their environment. Rather, the
use of the notion of ecology in this context refers to the specific ways in which a
given group interacts with, and exploits its environment, including domesticated
resources - and in turn creates the distinction between different ecologies in a
1
given context. Viewing this conflict not merely as a clash between religious
groups, but as a conflict over each groups’ practical and symbolic relationships
with its environment, adds an interesting dimension to the debate.
This case constitutes a perfect entry point into the challenges of the legal
management of ecological conflicts. Firstly, because it presents two radically
opposed (and easily identifiable) sets of beliefs and practices relating to a
specific animal —i.e. one particular element of the environment shared by the
two communities. Secondly, because the legal debate has revolved mainly around
religious and cultural arguments; considerations about health issues or animal
rights, that are usually central in ecological conflicts in Western liberal
democracies, are at best peripheral in this case. And thirdly, because of the rich,
numerous and observable traces produced by judicial and legislative institutions
of how the law has been struggling to decide this conflict, which enable the
identification and the discussion of the concrete processes involved in the legal
apprehension and management of religious diversity.
This paper thus aims at critically investigating the ways in which the Indian
2
legal system has addressed this conflict. In Part 2, I discuss the nature and the
origin of these two opposing ecological rationalities, and I try to place the
contemporary legal dispute in its complex historical and political dimensions. In
Parts 3 and 4, I explore the legislative and judicial responses that have been
1

2

This particular use of the notion of ecology has recently emerged in environmental studies in
order to avoid concepts such as “nature” or “environment” that are considered too narrow
and culturally situated. See for instance BRUNO LATOUR, POLITICS OF NATURE (Harvard
University Press, 2004), and PHILIPPE DESCOLA, BEYOND NATURE AND CULTURE
(University of Chicago Press, 2013).
For the purpose of this article, I will concentrate solely on practices of ritual sacrifice. It
should be noted here that cattle protection laws have engendered other legal conflicts with
Muslim communities in India, especially concerning commercial slaughtering, and sale and
export of cattle meat and products (which have however relied almost uniquely on
economic rather than religious or cultural arguments). For cases relating to these questions,
see for instance Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 93 and State
of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, AIR 2006 SC 212.
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progressively adopted after independence, in order to discuss the legal rationale
behind these decisions in Part 5.

II. THE ORIGIN OF TWO CONFLICTING ECOLOGIES
The sacred cow, a complex heritage
The veneration of the cow in Hindu culture remains a complex, evolving,
and somewhat equivocal ecological tradition. Although there is ample evidence
that the cow has been a symbol of wealth in India since ancient times, it appears
that they may not have always been as revered and protected as they are today.
Still, many writers have consistently pointed to old religious scriptures to argue
that the sanctity of gaumata (“mother cow”) constitutes a foundational belief of
3
Hinduism. Additionally, several legends in the Indian folklore tend to support
4
the view that the cow has for long enjoyed a particular status in India.
However, recent researches have contributed to raise doubts about the
5
origin and the continuity of this tradition. Authors like Dwijendra Narayan Jha
have argued that the “holiness” of the cow is ultimately a myth to which
fundamentalist Hindu organizations have clung. Indeed, historical evidence as
well as various accounts in the Vedas seem to indicate that practices of cow
6
sacrifice and beef eating were part of many important ceremonial occasions.
Others have argued that the prohibition of cow sacrifices and beef eating in
7
Hindu culture has been significantly influenced by Buddhism and Jainism. Still
others, like Marvin Harris, have argued that the origin of this belief was to be
found in economic rather than religious motivations, pointing at the heavy
reliance of the Hindu population on the cow for dairy products and for tilling
3

4

5

6
7

Authors generally refer to verses from the Rig Veda, which, apart from containing various
prayers and hymns in praise of the cow, have also at places equated it with God. The cow is
sometimes referred to as Aghnya, meaning one not to be killed. Additionally, the sanctity of
the cow is also often associated with the cult of Krishna.
For instance, a legend tells the story of the Chola King Manu Needhi Cholan, who
sentenced his own son Veedhividangan to death after he heard that the calf of a cow had
been killed under the wheels of his son’s chariot.
DWIJENDRA NARAYAN JHA, THE MYTH OF THE HOLY COW (Verso, 2002). The book
triggered a violent controversy in India. See also Marvin Harris, India’s Sacred Cow, 34
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 201 (1989).
S.M. BATRA, COWS AND COW-SLAUGHTER IN INDIA: RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
ASPECTS (1981).
Ram Punyani, Beef eating: Strangulating History, THE HINDU, August 14, 2001.
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the fields, and on cow dung as a source of fuel and fertilizer. In any case, it
appears that the commonly held belief that the cow has always been inviolable
and sacred in Hindu culture remains a controversial issue.
To understand this debate, it is further necessary to place it in its complex
historical and political dimensions. Indeed, the status of the cow has on several
occasions served as the support of political mobilisations in Modern India,
especially during the colonial period, as the practices of cow slaughter and beef
eating significantly intensified with the arrival of the British in the eighteenth
century. The first slaughterhouse in India was hence built in Calcutta in 1760 by
9
Robert Clive, the then Governor of Bengal. The insensitivity of the colonial
rulers to the cow thus resulted in obvious tension with the Hindu population, a
situation which triggered violent uprisings on several occasions, and later helped
structure the independence movement.
The reverence for the cow notably played an important role in the Indian
Revolt of 1857 against the East India Company, as rumors spread that the paper
cartridges used by Hindu and Muslim sepoys were greased with cow and pig fat.
While loading the gun, the soldiers had to bite the cartridge open to release the
powder. Knowledge of the origins of the grease caused many “Native” soldiers
10
to feel that the British were forcing them to break edicts of their religion. The
rebellion, which lasted for more than a year, resulted in the end of the East India
Company’s rule in India. In August, by the Government of India Act, 1858, the
company was formally dissolved and its ruling powers over India were
transferred to the British Crown.
In the period that followed, the veneration of the cow continued to serve
as a critical means of political mobilization against the British rulers. In the
1870s, cow protection movements, which first appeared in Punjab, started to
spread rapidly all over North India and to Bengal, Bombay and other central
provinces. The organizations rescued wandering cows, created gaushalas (cow
refuges), and demanded a ban on cow-slaughter. The issue was then relayed by
8

Marvin Harris, The Cultural Ecology of India's Sacred Cattle, 7(1) CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
51 (1966).
9 BARBARA D. METCALF & THOMAS R METCALF, A CONCISE HISTORY OF MODERN INDIA
83 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
10 KIM A. WAGNER, THE GREAT FEAR OF 1857: RUMOURS, CONSPIRACIES AND THE
MAKING OF THE INDIAN MUTINY 28-29 (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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many leaders of the independence movement, including Gandhi, in order to
11
mobilize the public to participate actively in the freedom movement. However,
although these movements were primarily targeting the colonial power, they also
contributed to escalating tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities,
resulting in numerous violent riots throughout this period. In 1893, during the
peak of the cow protection movement and immediately after an order from a
British magistrate who asked Muslims who wanted to sacrifice to register, riots
between Hindus and Muslims in Azamgarh district caused at least a hundred
12
casualties. Post-independence, the issue has continued to occupy a significant
place in regional and national political life, as Hindu nationalist parties such as
the BJP have unremittingly pushed cow protection as an integral part of their
13
political agenda.
At this point, it is crucial to note that the tensions between the two
communities have significantly crystalized over the ritual slaughter of cows by
14
Muslims on the occasion of Bakr-Id. I shall therefore explore the origins of
this tradition.
The ritual slaughter of the cow in Muslim culture
Bakr-Id (also known as Eid al-Adha, “Festival of the Sacrifice”) is
considered the most important Muslim holiday. It honours the willingness of
Ibrahim (Abraham) to sacrifice his son Ismail at Mina, near Mecca, as an act of
submission to God's command, before God intervened, through his angel
15
Jibra’il (Gabriel) and informed him that his sacrifice had already been accepted.
In remembrance of this episode, Muslims who can afford it have to sacrifice an
animal (a cow, a camel, a goat, a sheep, or a ram - depending on the region) as a
symbol of Ibrahim’s willingness to sacrifice his son.
Since the Quran is silent on the specifics of the sacrifice, the question of
whether the cow is specifically recommended for sacrifice, or is only among the
11 PETER VAN DER VEER, RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM. HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN INDIA 86-95
(University of California Press, 1994).
12 Id., at 92-3.
13 Manoj Joshi, Hindutva Politics and the Holy Cow, THE DAILY MAIL, February 4, 2012.
14 Hence, in 1916, Hindu protesters endeavoured to prevent a cow sacrifice in Patna, resulting
in a riot that took the life of several Muslims, in spite of the presence of armed police.
15 Contrary to the account of the episode in the Bible, there is no explicit mention in the
Quran of an animal replacing Ibrahim’s son; rather, he is replaced with a “great sacrifice”
(QURAN, 37: 100-111).
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permitted animals, has been the subject of great discussion. And this debate
has indeed been central in the different court cases where the legality of the
ritual has been under review. Since the Quran is silent on this, the most
important written source that explicitly discusses the ritual is the Hedaya, a
commentary on Islamic law, which states “the sacrifice established for one
17
person is a goat and that for seven a cow or a camel”. Additionally, some
18
hadiths from the Shahi Bhukari mention slaughter or sacrifice of cows.
Although it is generally assumed that cow sacrifice appeared and became
widespread in India when the territory was invaded by various Islamic rulers of
Arab and Central Asian origin after 1000 AD, it should be noted that most
Mughal emperors have tended to prohibit, or at least limit the practice during
19
their reign. Hence, in his testament to his son and successor Humayun, the
Mughal emperor Babur wrote:
The realm of Hindustan is full of diverse creeds.
Praise be to God, the Righteous, the Glorious,
the Highest, that He had granted unto you the
Empire of it. It is but proper that you, with heart
cleansed of all religious bigotry, should dispense
justice according to the tenets of each
community. And in particular refrain from the
sacrifice of cow, for that way lies the conquest of
the hearts of the people of Hindustan; and the
subjects of the realm will, through royal favour,
20
be devoted to you.
Nevertheless, the ritual of sacrificing a cow for Bakr-Id has persisted in
most parts of South Asia until today. Despite this relative lack of scriptural
references, it appears that the tradition has developed and been maintained
16 See for instance MURRAY T. TITUS, ISLAM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A RELIGIOUS
HISTORY OF ISLAM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 154 (2005) (hereinafter Titus).
17 CHARLES HAMILTON, THE HEDAYA, OR GUIDE: A COMMENTARY ON THE MUSSULMAN
LAWS (1791). See Section V(2) of this article for further discussion on the translation of the
Hedaya.
18 Hadiths are reports describing the sayings, actions, and habits of Muhammad; The Shahi
Bhukari is considered to be one of the most important sources of law after the Quran for
Sunni Muslims.
19 S.M. JAFFAR, THE MUGHAL EMPIRE FROM BABUR TO AURANGZEB (1936).
20 Id., at 89.
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mostly as an alternative to individual sacrifices, allowing the impoverished
members of Muslim communities to take part in the celebration. Indeed, by
allowing the sacrifice of a single animal for the benefit of seven persons, the
21
tradition has proved central in “democratizing” the holiday in South Asia. In
India, the practice is especially present in states with large Muslim communities
such as Assam, West Bengal, and Kerala, where Muslims respectively account
22
for 34%, 27%, and 26% of the population. Consequently, it has remained a
source of antagonism between the two most important religious communities
of the country – an antagonism that has been not only the subject of academic
debates, but also of fierce and impassionate political and judicial battles.
As noted above, the current tensions surrounding this practice are in a
large part the result of historical and political dynamics that developed during
the colonial period. At the time of independence, which resulted in terrible
communal violence, regulation on this issue was central. Yet, as we will see in the
next part, the Constituent Assembly was not able to push for the adoption of a
uniform legislation at the central level on this issue.

III. COW-SACRIFICE AND THE LAW
Despite several attempts to include a total ban on cow-slaughter in the
Constitution, the prohibition was eventually adopted as a non-justiciable
provision under Article 48. Individual States were thus eventually entrusted to
regulate on the issue by adopting laws governing cattle slaughter, which
consequently vary slightly from State to State. And as the Central Government
remained silent on the issue of the ritual sacrifice of cow on Bakr-Id, it was
ultimately the responsibility of States to decide whether or not the practice
should be accommodated locally.
Constitutional provisions
In 1940, seven years before Independence, a proposition for a complete
prohibition of cow-slaughter was first issued by one of the Special Committees
of the Indian National Congress. An amendment for the inclusion of an article
seeking to “prohibit the slaughter of cow and other useful cattle” was then
21 Titus, at 154-7.
22 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, CENSUS OF INDIA (2011). Islam constitutes a minority religion in
India, with 14% of the country’s population (i.e. approximately 172 million people)
identifying as adherents.

111

Law and Ecological Conflicts: The Case of the Sacred Cow in India

moved before the Constituent Assembly. The demand, which revolved mainly
around economic rather than religious arguments, aimed at incorporating the
clause in the Fundamental Rights chapter of the Constitution – thus preventing
23
individual States from opting out of the ban.
However, the proposition faced considerable opposition in the Assembly,
with arguments ranging from the usefulness of cattle products for exportation,
to undue discrimination against the non-Hindu population – although, here
again, the issue of ritual sacrifices for Bakr-Id was ignored in the discussions.
The amendment was hence debated, and eventually adopted as a Directive
24
Principle under Article 48 of the Constitution. Entitled “Organisation of
agriculture and animal husbandry”, it reads as follows:
The state shall endeavour to organise agriculture
and animal husbandry on modern and scientific
lines and shall, in particular, take steps for
preserving and improving the breeds, and
prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and
other milch and draught cattle.
‘Preservation, Protection and Improvement of Stock’ was consequently
26
placed under the State List of the Constitution, thus empowering individual
states to legislate on the matter. Their freedom to manoeuvre appeared at first
limited, as the instruction resulting from Article 48 was seemingly
straightforward in enjoining State Governments to adopt laws prohibiting cowslaughter. Yet, only a few months after the promulgation of the Constitution,
the Central Government sent a letter to State Governments directing them to
refrain from adopting a total ban, arguing:
Hides from slaughtered cattle are much superior
to hides from the fallen cattle and fetch a higher
price. In the absence of slaughter, the best type
23 MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CATTLE (2002) (hereinafter Ministry).
24 In India, the “Directive Principles of State Policy” constitute fundamental guidelines for
the State governments to be applied in the process of law and policy-making. These
provisions, contained in Part IV of the Constitution, are however not enforceable by
courts.
25 INDIA CONST. art. 48.
26 Entry 15 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
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of hide, which fetches good price in the export
market, will no longer be available. A total ban on
slaughter is thus detrimental to the export trade
and works against the interest of the Tanning
27
industry in the country.
These contradictory directives, resulting from a clash between secularist
and religious agendas, coupled with antagonist economic rationales, can
certainly explain the current discrepancies amongst State legislations governing
the slaughter of cattle. The Hindu right-wing parties have since then repeatedly
highlighted the government’s unwillingness to lay down an absolute prohibition
as an affront to the sentiments of the majority Hindu community, and another
28
example of appeasement of minorities.
State Laws
Soon after the Constitution came into force, most States progressively
started to enact laws regulating cow-slaughter. Till date, only Kerala, Sikkim,
Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland have not adopted such
legislations. However, the nature and the scope of these regulations vary
significantly from State to State, notably on whether the prohibition is absolute
or relative.
For instance, States like Assam, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal can issue
“fit-for-slaughter” certificates allowing for the slaughter of cows in certain
conditions, while others like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Gujarat have adopted a
29
complete ban on cow-slaughter. Offenders generally face up to six months in
jail, but some States are considerably more severe. In Gujarat for instance, the
sentence can go up to seven years in jail, while other States like Madhya Pradesh
and Rajasthan have adopted policies that fix mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment.
27 Ministry, Chapter 1, at 64.
28 Numerous attempts to address the issue through a central legislation have been made since
the adoption of the Constitution, although none have been successful in obtaining a
complete nationwide ban on cow slaughter. In 1966, a violent riot broke out outside the
Parliament in Delhi during a demonstration supporting a demand by several Hindu
organizations for a country-wide ban on cow slaughter.
29 Moreover, sale of beef is also selectively prohibited in many States, some allowing only
beef imported from other States to be sold, while others like Haryana, Himachal and
Madhya Pradesh banning it completely.

113

Law and Ecological Conflicts: The Case of the Sacred Cow in India

Interestingly for our discussion, at least two States —namely West Bengal
and Assam— have included specific exemptions based on religious
considerations, to the prohibition, although these exemption regimes vary in
their degree of specificity. Hence, Section 12 of the West Bengal Animal
Slaughter Control Act, 1950, provides that the State Government may exempt
from the operation of the Act, the slaughter of cattle for any religious, medicinal
or research purposes —but without referring specifically to Bakr-Id rituals.
Section 13 of the Assam Cattle Preservation Act, 1950, includes a similar
provision, but crucially adds:
Provided that the operation of the Act will not
be applicable to the slaughter of any cattle on the
occasion of Id-uz-Zuha festival on such
conditions as the State Government may specify
regarding privacy.
Despite these two examples, most States have ultimately remained silent
on the question, once again ignoring its importance. As a consequence, courts
have on several occasions been called upon to decide the underlying clash in
these regulations between the veneration for the cow in Hindu culture and the
ritual sacrifice of cows by Muslims on Bakr-Id.

IV. JUDICIAL ENCOUNTERS WITH PRACTICES OF RITUAL SACRIFICE
The inability of the legislative power to resolve this ecological conflict has
logically paved the way for judicial disputes. Notably, the courts have had to
decide (1) whether State legislations banning slaughtering – and thus ritual
sacrifices – of cows violate the rights to religious freedom of practitioners of
Islam, as protected by the Constitution, and (2) whether the ritual sacrifice of
cows on Bakr-Id could be protected by State regulations allowing for the
exemption of slaughtering performed for religious purposes.
Quareshi
The first significant case to reach the Supreme Court was decided in 1958.
In the case M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar,30 the constitutional validity of three
legislative enactments banning the slaughter of cattle passed by the States of
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, were challenged on the grounds that
30 Mohammed Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 (hereinafter Quareshi ).
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these acts violated the fundamental rights guaranteed to the Muslim petitioners
31
under Articles 14, 19 and 25 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court
held that a total ban on the slaughter of useless cattle could not be supported as
reasonable in the interest of the general public, and therefore was invalid.
However, a total ban on the slaughter of milch cattle, breeding bulls and
working bullocks, which were considered essential to the nation’s economy for
milk, working power and also manure, was held to be valid and reasonable, as
being in the interest of the general public. Moreover, the Court upheld a total
ban on the slaughter of cows of all ages, and calves of cows as being in
consonance with the directive principles laid down in Article 48 of the
Constitution.
More importantly for our discussion, the Supreme Court endeavoured to
inquire in detail the claim that sacrifice of a cow on Bakr-Id constitutes a
religious requirement for Muslims, and should hence invalidate legislative
provisions preventing it. However, the Court considered that the materials
presented to support this claim were “extremely meagre”, and was surprised that
32
the allegations in the petitions were “so vague.” The Court notably regrets that
the claim was not supported by an affidavit by any academic expert or religious
leader explaining in greater depth, the nature and the significance of the
practice, or more prosaically the implications of the religious scriptures adduced
33
as evidence. As a consequence, the Court ultimately relied on the translation of
the Hedaya to conclude that it was not established that the sacrifice of a cow on
Bakr-Id was an obligatory overt act for a Muslim to exhibit his religious beliefs
and ideas. The practice being judged optional, it was not entitled to
constitutional protection under Article 25.
This first decision thus closed the door of a general protection of the
practice under the religious rights enshrined in the Constitution and individual
States were held free to prohibit it. The only avenue left for accommodation was
thus the adoption of specific exemptions within State legislations banning cow
slaughtering. But as we will see below, the scope of the exemption regime must
be precisely defined in order to accommodate the practice.
31 Article 14 ensures equality before the law, Article 19 affirms the right to practice any
profession, and Article 25 affirms the right to freedom of religion.
32 Quareshi, at 19.
33 Id., at 20.
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Lahiri
Hence, when the issue reached the Supreme Court again in 1995, it was
the State power to grant an exemption accommodating ritual sacrifices of cows
for Bakr-Id, rather than the general prohibition of this practice, that was
34
challenged. Indeed, the dispute started when several plaintiffs filed a writ
petition before the Calcutta High Court, contending that the State of West
Bengal had wrongly invoked Section 12 of the West Bengal Animal Slaughter
Control Act, 1950, when it exempted from the operation of the Act, the
slaughter of healthy cows on the occasion of Bakr-Id.
On August 20, 1982, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, after
hearing the contesting parties, took the view that such slaughter of cows by
members of the Muslim community on Bakr-Id did not constitute a religious
requirement and, therefore, such exemption was outside the scope of Section 12
of the Act. Consequently, the State of West Bengal appealed the decision before
the Supreme Court. As in Quareshi, the Court relied once again on the provisions
of the Hedaya to hold that slaughtering of cows was not the only way of
carrying out the ritual sacrifice, and that it was therefore not an essential religious
35
purpose, but an optional one. Then, considering that the State could only
exercise the exemption power under Section 12 if it can be shown that such
exemption is necessary for serving an essential religious, medicinal or research
36
purpose, the Court concluded that such was not the case of cow sacrifice for
Bakr-Id, and therefore rejected the appeal.
The reasoning of the Court in this case appears problematic insofar as it
adopted a highly restrictive interpretation of the exemption regime under
Section 12 of the West Bengal Act. Although the provision refers to “any
37
religious purpose ,” the Court construed it as restricted to essential religious
practices, and consequently considered that it could not serve as a basis for
exempting sacrificial practices for Bakr-Id from the application of the Act. Such
an interpretation arguably gutters the religious exemption under Section 12:
what religious practice could indeed be eligible for exemption under this
provision?
34
35
36
37

State of West Bengal v. Ashutosh Lahiri, AIR 1995 SC 464.
Id., at 8.
Id., at 9.
Sec. 12, West Bengal Animal Slaughter Control Act, 1950.
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Read together, these two Supreme Court decisions – which have been
38
consistently reaffirmed by lower courts in other instances – appear to almost
completely shut the door to the accommodation of the ritual sacrifice of cows
for Bakr-Id, except when States have not adopted any legislation prohibiting the
slaughtering of cattle (as in the case of Kerala), or when they have enacted
specific provisions which explicitly exempt this practice from the application of
anti-slaughter regulations (as in the case of Assam). Indeed, the Supreme Court
made it clear in Lahiri that mechanisms of exemptions which refer to religious
concerns in general and unspecified terms (as in the case of West Bengal) could
not protect a practice that was deemed only “optional”.
It should be noted here that courts have tended to adopt a similar
approach in other cases dealing with ritual practices of animal sacrifice
performed by devotees of Hindu sects. For instance, in 2002, the Andhra
Pradesh High Court directed several actions to prevent large-scale sacrifices of
39
animals for the fair of Sri Lingamanthula Swamy in Nalgonda District. Similar
40
41
42
decisions were reached in Uttarakhand , Gujarat , and Karnataka , with the
courts consistently holding that rights to religious freedom could not exempt
43
these practices from the application of laws preventing animal sacrifices.
It remains that the legal reasoning that resulted in the rejection, of this
claim for religious freedom, by the judicial system has to be questioned. What
were the legal reasoning, the evidence, and the methods of appreciation, which
led to the consideration that these ritual practices did not constitute an essential
part of the Muslim faith? The ways in which the courts have dealt with this
ecological practice need to be thoroughly explored and interrogated. This is
what I shall attempt to do in the last part.
38 See for instance Shaikh Zahid Mukhtar v. Commissioner of Police, (2007) 109 BOM LR
1201; see also the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in the matters of Abhijit Das v.
State of West Bengal (2010); Enamul Haque v. State of West Bengal (2010); and Rajesh
Yadav v. State of West Bengal (2011).
39 Jasraj Shri Shrimal And Ors. v. Govt. Of A.P., 2002 ALT 656 (Andhra Pradesh High Court).
40 Gauri Maulekhi v. State of Uttarakhand (19 December, 2011) (Uttarakhand High Court).
41 Vadodara City District Samasth v. State Of Gujarat, 2001 CriLJ 184 (Gujarat High Court).
42 Alevoor Premraj Kini v. The Deputy Commissioner (20 March, 2015) (Karnataka High
Court).
43 In these cases, either the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, or State laws
prohibiting animal sacrifices, such as the Gujarat Animals & Birds Sacrifices (Prevention)
Act, 1972, or the Karnataka Prevention of Animal Sacrifices Act, 1959.
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V. RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATION AND COLONIAL LEGACY
In order to analyse the way in which the Supreme Court interpreted the
religious significance of ritual sacrifice of cows for Muslims, it is necessary to
briefly recall the historical dynamics that led to the construction of the judicial
interpretation of Islamic traditions in India. They have indeed profoundly
structured the way in which Indian judges now interpret religious traditions and
beliefs.
The limits of scripturalism
In particular, it is crucial to note that, in their effort at systematising this
body of law over many decades, colonial jurists turned almost exclusively to a
44
limited number of textual sources. This approach had profound effects on
judicial processes beyond the colonial period, as it led the courts to endorse
highly orthodox forms of Islamic law.
The British efforts at codifying “native” laws can be traced back to the
Warren Hastings’ Plan of 1772, and were primarily based on translations of
45
ancient scriptural texts. Hence, classical religious-legal texts, whatever their
genuine relevance, were taken as the key to understanding colonised cultures and
societies, even though the positions articulated in the scriptures could often be
far removed from the actual prevalent practices in the given religious
communities.
Of course, focusing on textual sources facilitated the administrators’ task
of ascertaining general legal rules quickly, but it fundamentally misunderstood
the role of these religious texts in the life of most South Asian Muslims –
especially beyond specific urban and gentry groups. The legalist ideology of
colonial judges erred on the side of applying clear rules in a consistent manner,
regardless of whether people genuinely treated them as binding.
Lost in translation
Given the assumed preference for a strict scriptural approach, colonial
legal administrators were eager to have Islamic texts translated into English so
44 See Michael R. Anderson, Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India, in DAVID
ARNOLD AND PETER ROBB (EDS.), INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES: A SOAS SOUTH ASIA
READER 65 (Curzon Press, 1993) (hereinafter Anderson).
45 J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Administration of Hindu Law by the British, 4(1) COMPARATIVE
STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, 10 (1961).
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that indigenous laws could be applied directly by British judges. Looking for a
unified Islamic law, British administrators hence endeavoured to identify
classical Islamic texts and to treat them as binding legal codes. They focused
46
their study on Hedaya (al-Hidaya ), a twelfth-century text of Central Asian origin
that was taken as the central legal source for the Hanafi school, although it is
generally agreed that it does not consistently provide the underlying logic or
47
reasoning for the rules of the school .
At the insistence of Hastings, Hedaya was translated into English in 1791
by Charles Hamilton – a British Orientalist who died a few months after the
publication. British judges were content to rely on Charles Hamilton’s
translation of Hedaya, although Hamilton did not translate directly from the
original Arabic text. Instead, three Muslim clerics were commissioned to
translate the Arabic text into Persian, which Hamilton then translated into
48
English. This translated legal treatise hence provided the British with a textual
foundation to understand and apply Islamic law, although a considerable
49
number of translating errors and omissions were later discovered.
Moreover, Hamilton’s original translated text comprised four volumes.
Yet, as a large and voluminous work was often not easily available by the late
nineteenth century, the translated Hedaya proved very costly for students at the
Inns of Court in Britain who wanted to practise law in India and needed to
purchase the text to qualify themselves for the English Bar. Consequently, in
1870, the editor of the second edition of the Hedaya decided to remove whole
50
sections of Hamilton’s translation.
Ultimately, the colonial administration ended up adopting a reductive
approach to Islamic law. Firstly, because this approach failed at recognizing that,
although scriptural sources provided an authoritative foundation for juristic
analysis and interpretation, they did not, by themselves, constitute a legal system.
The Quran, and even more specifically legal texts such as Hedaya, had never
46 AL-MARGHINANI, AL-HIDAYA: SHARH BIDAYAT AL-MUBTADI’ (1197).
47 The Hanafi tradition, one of the four Sunni legal schools (madhahib), is predominant in
South Asia. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (Harvard University Press, 1980).
48 Anderson, at 98.
49 Anver M. Emon, Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence, and Multicultural
Accommodation, 87 THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW 391 (2008).
50 Id., at 403.
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been directly applied as sources of legal precept. Their legal relevance had
always derived from a properly authoritative religious leader (qadi) whose moral
probity and knowledge of local arrangements could translate precept into
practice. And secondly, because the selection of the legal texts that were to
become the source of Islamic law for British judges was both highly reductive
and flawed with omissions and translation mistakes.
It can be argued that this approach of the judicial treatment of religious
51
traditions has continued after independence. From the 1950s, the principle
that it was the courts’ task to ascertain what constituted religious doctrine and
practice was firmly established. Indeed, in the two Supreme Court’s decisions
discussed previously, judges limited themselves to a mere scriptural
interpretation of the sacrifice tradition at issue, based solely on excerpts from
Hamilton’s translation of Hedaya.
Hence, the Court’s appreciation that the practice is only “secondary” and
not “essential” for Muslim practitioners appears highly problematic for two
reasons. Firstly, because it raises the fundamental question of whether, and to
what extent, judges can interpret religious traditions. In deciding that the
practice was only secondary, the Supreme Court indeed took a strong stance on
the definition of the content of the Islamic faith, a position that many
52
jurisdictions consider as problematic. And secondly, because the approach
appears too restrictive. What if relevant developments had been lost in the
successive translations and re-edition of the Hedaya? What if other religious
sources had been overlooked? Moreover, it is regretful that no expertise, either
53
academic or religious, was adduced to give context to the practice. In any case,
these shortcomings certainly cast doubts on the validity of the religious
interpretation reached by the Court in this complex ecological conflict.
51 See ROBERT D. BAIRD (ED.), RELIGION AND LAW IN INDEPENDENT INDIA (2005).
52 In many legal systems, judges indeed only undertake to assess whether a practice or a belief
can be considered as “sincerely-held” by a claimant; see for instance, in the case of Canada,
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 (Supreme Court of Canada).
53 The recourse to cultural expertise has indeed become central in this kind of conflicts in
many other jurisdictions. See for instance Alison Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense:
Challenging the Monocultural Paradigm, in MARIE-CLAIRE FOBLETS ET AL. (EDS.), CULTURAL
DIVERSITY AND THE LAW: STATE RESPONSES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (2010). Yet,
this reluctance of the Indian legal system to rely on such experts seems to echo the growing
dismissal of religious experts by British judges during the colonial period. See Anderson, at
112.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Ecological conflicts evidently constitute challenging cases for legal
systems. And this is even truer when the contentious traditions are very
emblematic and fiercely defended, as is the case for the status of the cow in
India. In this paper, I have briefly presented the consecutive legal decisions that
have led to almost completely outlawing the practice of sacrificing cows for
Bakr-Id in India (except in States with no legislations banning cow-slaughter,
and in States which adopted specific exemptions for that practice).
Read in conjunction with similar decisions reached in cases dealing with
animal sacrifices performed by certain Hindu sects, this attitude of the Indian
legal system seems to demonstrate a failure at acknowledging the importance of
ecological beliefs and traditions of minority groups – and hence, at
accommodating them. Considering the amount of research in environmental
studies that have been, since the 1970s, increasingly highlighting the complexity
54
and the significance of these traditions, I argue that these conflicts should be
approached in a more cautious and rigorous manner by legislative and judiciary
institutions.
Nevertheless, the concrete consequences of these decisions remain to be
assessed on the ground. Indeed, the repeated legal actions introduced before the
West Bengal courts seem to indicate that the practice has not disappeared in this
State – most probably thanks to an implicit policy of selective non-enforcement
by the local executive authorities. Hence, the question of whether this ecological
practice will eventually cease to be part of the identity of Indian Muslim
communities remains to be thoroughly explored.

*******

54 See for instance JOHN B. CALLICOTT, EARTH’S INSIGHTS: A MULTICULTURAL SURVEY OF
ECOLOGICAL ETHICS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN TO THE AUSTRALIAN
OUTBACK (University of California Press, 1994); PHILIPPE DESCOLA, THE ECOLOGY OF
OTHERS (Prickly University Press, 2013).
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